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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Backup Flight System
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
a--_roach features a top-_[6-wn analysis of the-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Backup Flight
System (BFS) hardware.
The BFS hardware consists of one General Purpose Computer (GPC)
loaded with backup flight software and the components used to
engage/disengage that unique GPC. Specifically, the BFS hardware
includes the following:
o DDU (Display Driver Unit)
o BFC (Backup Flight Controller)
o GPC (General Purpose Computer)
o Switches (Engage, Disengage, GPC, CRT)
o Circuit Protectors (Fuses, Circuit Breakers)
The IOA analysis process utilized available BFS hardware drawings
and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and
hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and
analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was
assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure
mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the major divisions of the BFS. A summary of the number of
failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below with
Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F) criticality
second.
L
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Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality:
Number
i/i I 2/IR 2/2
16 1 3 - 3/IR12 3/2R2 3/36 I TOTAL29
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
I
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HWIF)
Criticality:
Number
i/i
16
2/IR 2/2
3 3JiRI_312R{2TOTAL21
Of the failure modes analyzed, 19 could potentially result in a
loss of life and/or loss of vehicle.
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Figure 1 - BFS OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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I2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for completeness and
technical accuracy.
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2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
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2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utiliz-
ing as-built drawings to divide the respective subsystem into
components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item is
evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These data
are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report, and
are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 BFS Ground Rules and Assumptions
The BFS specific ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
presented in Appendix B.
u
w
z :
w
w
W
J
w
L
5
w
3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The following sections describe the BFS hardware. This hardware
comprises a GPC, DDUs, BFCs, several switches, status indicators,
and circuit protectors. An overview of the system components is
shown in Figure 2.
3.1 Design and Function
The Backup Flight System provides the flight crew with a vehicle
control capability to be used if the primary system malfunctions.
The BFS software resides in one GPC, normally GPC 5, during
ascent and entry. In the event a generic failure occurs in the
Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) or three or more primary
GPCs fail, the crew will engage the BFS. During dynamic flight
phases (e.g. not on-orbit) return to the primary system is not
provided once the BFS is engaged.
Hardware elements included in this report are those specific to
the BFS. Evaluation of specific components such as navigation
aids, flight control sensors that are common to the BFS and the
PASS, and components such as dedicated instrument displays that
are driven by the BFS outputs are not included in this report.
Processing schemes differ between PASS and BFS with the result
that some component failures become more critical with BFS
engaged. It is beyond the scope of this report to present all
the software differences between PASS and BFS or to present a
comparison of the failure criticalities for non-BFS-unique
hardware with or without BFS engaged.
The BFS is limited by definition, for this report, to those
unique hardware items that function in response to the action
taken by the flight crew to engage or disengage the BFS.
Reference Figure 3. More specifically, the BFS consists of the
following components:
, Two DDUS which supply power to the BFS engage switches
on the left and right Rotation Hand Controllers (RHCs)
and to the Hand Controller Engage Drivers (HCEDs) in
the Backup Flight Controller (BFC) modules. Each DDU
has three power supplies (A, B, and C) redundantly tied
through regulators to two of the three Main A, B, and C
buses.
, Three BFCs, each with identical modules A and B,
receive inputs from crew configured switches, and
output discrete signals to their respective GPCs.
Logic circuits select which GPCs control flight
critical buses and drive CRT displays prior and
subsequent to BFS engagement.
. One GPC loaded with backup flight software. From a
hardware standpoint, a GPC consists of a Central
Processing Unit (CPU) and Input/Output Processor (IOP),
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Figure 2 -BFS SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure 3 - BFS ENGAGE/DISENGAGE HARDWARE AND DATA INTERFACES
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each with many subcomponents. Since there is only one
GPC to provide the backup control capability, it will
be treated as a black box. Regardless of what hardware-
component failure renders the GPC inoperable, the
criticality is the same as a generic black-box failure.
Twenty crew-activated switches (15 GPC, 2 BFS engage, 1
BFS disengage, and 2 CRT) are used to control the GPC
operating configuration and CRT interfaces with the BFS
GPC.
, Crew interface with the BFS is through the
Multifunction CRT Display System (MCDS). During normal
flight operations, one of the Cathode Ray Tubes (CRTs)
in the forward station will be commanded by the BFS.
BFS MCDS selection in the forward station is governed
by the BFS CRT switch on panel C3 or the GPC/CRT key on
the keyboard. Current preengage BFS procedures call
for CRT3 to be the BFS CRT in the forward station.
The BFS operates in one of two operating states: engaged and
disengaged. The BFS is intended to remain in a disengaged state
during routine operations allowing the PASS to control the
vehicle. Both the engage and disengage states are provided to
the GPCs through the BFCs. These BFCs provide interface through
a series of discrete signals between the GPCs and associated
crew- station switches• Engage is accomplished by verifying that
the BFS GPC output switch is in the backup position, DDU power-
supply breakers in, and depressing the engage-momentary
pushbutton on either right or left RHC.
when one of the RHC pushbuttons is depressed, three discretes
(A, B, C) of ones are sent to the BFS GPC. The BFS GPC must
receive two of three discretes plus a zero discrete from the I/O
terminate B before the BFS can be engaged. After the BFS is
engaged, control of the vehicle is assumed by the BFS, and the
PASS GPCs go to a state of software halt. The BFS then controls
the flight-critical and payload-data buses and specified display-
keyboard buses. Indications that the BFS is engaged are that BFC
eyebrow panel lights on F2 and F4 will be ON, BFS output talkback
(TB) on panel 06 will be gray, and all PASS GPCs output TBs on
panel 06 will be barberpole.
In the disengaged state, the BFS GPC processes vehicle-control
parameters in parallel with the PASS GPCs. During the disengage
state, the BFS maintains knowledge of the vehicle state by
listening on the flight-critical data buses commanded by the PASS
GPCs. The disengaged BFS GPC also performs limited SM and FDA
functions during 0PS i, 3, and 6. To disengage the BFS from the
engage state, the BFC disengage switch on panel F6 is positioned
to DISENGAGE (up position)• The engage discretes to the BFS will
be reset to zero and the I/O terminate discrete set to one.
Control of the FC and PL data buses will be released to the PASS.
This is indicated by the BFC light going OFF, the PASS output TBs
J_
going gray, and BFS output TB going barberpole. The PASS GPCs
must be re-Initial Program Loaded (re-IPLed) prior to disengage.
Thus the BFS disengage capability is provided only during
quiescent vehicle flight.
If BFS is engaged it will drive several dedicated instrument
displays in the forward station. This is instrumentation needed
to safely fly the vehicle during the final phases of entry and
landing. Two of the three Altitude Director Indicators (ADIs)
are driven by the BFS in OPS 1 and OPS 3. The four scales
(Alpha, Accel, M/Vel, EAS) of the Alpha/Mach Indicator (AMI) are
driven by BFS in OPS major modes 304 and 305. Likewise, the four
scales (Alt Accel, Alt Rate, Alt, Rad Alt) of the
Altitude/vertical Velocity Indicator (AVVI) are driven by engaged
BFS in major modes 304 and 305. The Horizontal Situation
Indicator (HSI) provides magnetic heading, course, course
deviation, glide-slope deviation, and primary and secondary
bearing, and the Surface Position Indicator (SPI), provides
elevons, body flap percent, rudder, aileron, and speedbrake
percent. The HSI and SPI are driven by the engaged BFS.
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The BFS GPC and three BFCs are located in Avionics Bays 1 and 2.
All other hardware components are located in the forward flight
deck. The BFS interfaces with Orbiter subsystems via the flight-
critical and payload data buses and flight-forward and flight-
aft MDMs.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the BFS hardware components.
3.4 BFS Sensitivity to Interfacing Subsystem Operation
An exhaustive comparison of the BFS and PASS is beyond the scope
of this report. However, a limited investigation of BFS
sensitivity to Operation in certain guidance, navigation, and
control subsystems was performed. References 12 and 13
constituted the BFS capability description for this
investigation.
Compared to the PASS the BFS capability for fault detection is
minimal due to minimum redundance management capability. As a
result the BFS is substantiallymore vunerable to malfunctions in
interfacing subsystems. The specific subsystems investigated
included the Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs), Air Data System
(ADS), Rate Gyro Assemblies (RGA) and Accelerometer Assemblies
(AA), Rotational Hand Controller (RHC), Speedbrake Thrust
Controller (SBTC), Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA), and a
limited collection of cockpit switches.
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3.4.1 Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
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3.4.2
3.4.3
The BFS does not use the Built in Test Equipment (BITE)
or the ECHO features provided by IMU hardware. The BFS
only faults an IMU when it has detected a Communications
Fault (COM FAULT). In nominal operations the BFS uses
a mid-value select. If an IMU is COM FAULTED, the
lowest numbered IMU which has not been COM FAULTED will
be selected. If two IMUs have been COM FAULTED, then
data from the remaining IMU will be processed. If all
three IMUs are COM FAULTED, the system will then try to
reselect the last failed IMU.
This data-selection process makes the BFS extremely
sensitive and vunerable to IMU number 1 malfunctions
which do not result in a COM FAULT on IMU number I.
:Without regard to IMU number 1 performance, a simple
COM FAULT on either IMU number 2 or 3 will allow that
performance to be immediately propagated throughout the
entire GN&C system.
Air Data System (ADS)
The data from this subsystem is vital to many
computations, since several of the items measured by
this subsystem are used throughout the GN&C software.
The main item of concern is the Nose Landing Gear
Uplock Discrete, V51X0300X. This discrete is used by
the BFS software to determine if a correction factor is
applied in the angle-of-attack calculation, the
corrected static-pressure calculation, and the
corrected total-pressure calculation. These three
terms are then used to determine Mach Number, Pressure
Altitude, Dynamic Pressure (Q'Bar), Equivalent Airspeed
(EAS), and Estimated True Airspeed. The inclusion of
the correction factor in the calculation is due to
changes in the flow around the ADS when the nose gear
is down.
Depending on the size of the correction factor being
applied, the corrected static-pressure and corrected
total-pressure values could be changed to a significant
degree. Any calculations which use these values in
either a first order or second order calculation would
be in error, and this error would be factored into the
Guidance and Navigation functions. The errors could be
large enough to cause a loss of the vehicle.
Rate Gyro Assemblies (RGA) and
Accelerometer Assembly (AA)
The BFS uses only three of the four RGAs on the Orbiter
and the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB). The fourth RGA is
not used. Similarly, the BFS uses only three of the
Ii
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3.4.4
3.4.5
3.4.6
3.4.7
four AAs. Only one scale factor and bias is used for
three Orbiter RGAs, and one scale factor and bias is
used for the SRBs RGAs. Only one scale factor and bias
is used for all AAs. The PASS provides scale factor
and bias for each of the RGA and AA.
The use of a single set of scale factor and bias for a
group of RGAs and AAs is acceptable if the LRUs are
very consistant. If, however, the performance is not
very consistant, the data coming back from the LRUs
could have large over-compensated variations.
Rotational Hand Controller (RHC)
The BFS does not support RHC processing in ascent
modes. The BFS does not validate the RHC inputs by
using the data-good indicator as in the PASS. There is
no requirement to process the left RHC data before or
after the right RHC data. The lack of a requirement
for the order of processing RHC data is different than
that found in the PASS. There may be a need to process
the Commander's inputs before the Pilot's, as is done
in the PASS.
Speedbrake Thrust Controller (SBTC)
The BFS does not have manual-throttling capability in
ascent as does the primary. The BFS does process both
SBTC.
Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA)
The BFS processes only the Commander's inputs.
is no redundancy when the BFS is engaged.
There
Cockpit Switches
The following switches have redundant partners, one set
at the Commander's station and another set at the
Pilot's station. The BFS processes only those switches
at the Commander's station. Pilot's station switches
are not processed.
TACAN source for HSI F6 $4
MSBLS source for HSI F6 $4
NAV source for HSI F6 $4
V72K8587X
V72K8589X
V72K8588X
ADI Attitude Ref PB a F6 $3
PB b
ADI Attitude Inertial F6 $3
ADI Attitude LV/LH F6 S3
ADI Attitude reference F6 $3
V72K2051X
V72K2052X
V72K2015X
V72K2016X
V72K2017X
l
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There may be physically duplicated switches in the
cockpit. However, since the BFS does not process some
of them, the Pilot station switches can not be
considered redundant to the Commander's switches.
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure modes
are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of the
failure criticalities. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs. I
+ + zi
TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
DDU
BFC
GPC
SW
CP
IND
i/I
6
2
4
4
2/IR
1
1
1
i
w
2/2
w
i
i
I
w
m
3/IR
w
w
m
2
3/2R
1
I
1
i
3/3
TOTAL 16 3 - 2 2 6
TOTAL
1
9
2
9
6
2
29
i
I
I
=
I
Of the 29 failure modes analyzed, 16 single failures were
determined to result in loss of the crew or vehicle. A summary
of the Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented in Table II.
Appendix D presents a cross reference between each PCI and a
specific worksheet in Appendix C.
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TABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
DDU
BFC
GPC
SW
CP
IND
i/i
6
2
4
4
2/1R
1
1
1
2/2
1
i
i
i
I
3/1R 3/2R TOTAL
1
8
2
6
4
I TOTAL 116 1 3 1 - I - l 2 1 21
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4.1 Display Driver Unit (DDU)
The analysis of the DDU examined one failure mode for the three
power supplies. The DDU powers the HCEDs and the BFC engage
pushbutton. Loss of power from two or more power supplies may
disable BFS engage capability. If the BFS is needed, this could
result in loss of the crew and vehicle. This failure has been
identified as a PCI and is listed in Appendix D.
4.2 Backup Flight Controller (BFC)
The BFC analysis considered nine failure modes for six
components. Of these, eight PCIs were identified and are listed
in Appendix D.
The BFC implements the BFS engage and disengage commands. In
addition, it houses the BFS CRT-select logic and the halt relay
to the interfacing GPC. Failure of the HCED, engage/disengage
logic, BFC power supply or power up/down monitor logic, impairs
the capability to engage the BFS. These components are therefore
vital to the safety of the crew and vehicle.
Activation of a halt relay temporarily or permanently disables
the interfacing GPC. Inadvertent operation of a halt relay can
be catastrophic if it occurs in the BFC interfacing with the BFS
GPC. Failure of the halt relay to operate when desired will, at
worst, impact mission objectives.
The CRT-select logic performs a nonessential function, and its
failure therefore has no serious consequences.
4.3 General Purpose Computer (GPC)
The GPC assigned to host BFS software was analyzed for two
failure modes - loss of output and erroneous output. In either
case, failure is catastrophic if the BFS is needed. Both
failures have been identified as PCIs and are listed in Appendix
D.
4.4 Switches (SW)
The switch analysis considered nine failure modes for seven
switches. Six of the nine failure modes were identified as PCIs
and are listed in Appendix D.
Switches that are vital to proper engage and operation of the BFS
include the engage pushbuttons, the disengage switch and the BFS
GPC power, output, and mode switches. Failure of these switches
may endanger the crew and vehicle.
15
The CRT display and select switches are nonessential. The worst-
case effect of a failure of one of these two switches is a minor
change in crew procedure.
4.5 Circuit Protection (CP)
The circuit protection analysis examined the "open circuit"
failure for six circuit protectors. Power to discretes and
hardware components is vital to the operation of BFS hardware;
therefore, failure of any circuit protector has a potential
safety impact to the crew and vehicle. Four of the six failure
modes were identified as PCIs and are listed in Appendix D.
4.6 Indicators (IND)
The BFC engage light is the one indicator unique to the BFS. Two
failure modes were analyzed and no PCIs were identified. Other
indicators are available to show BFS engage/disengage status and
operational status for all GPCs_
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ADTA
AOA
ATO
BFC
BFS
BSS
CIL
CPU
CRIT
CRT
C&W
DDU
DEU
DPS
DU
EVA
FA
FF
FM
FMEA
GPC
GSE
HCED
IMU
IOA
IOP
IPL
KU
LRU
MCDS
MDAC
MDM
MM
MMU
NA
NASA
NSTS
OMRSD
OMS
PAS
PASS
PB
PCI
RCS
RHC
RI
RM
RPC
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
Air Data Transducer Assembly
Abort Once Around
Abort to Orbit
Backup Flight Controller
Backup Flight System
Backup System Services
Critical Items List
Central Processing Unit
Criticality
Cathode Ray Tube
Caution and Warning System
Display Driver Unit
Display Electronics Unit
Data Processing System
Display Unit
Extra vehicular Activity
Flight Aft
Flight Forward
Failure Mode
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
General Purpose Computer
Ground Support Equipment
Hand Controller Engage Driver
Inertial Measurement Unit
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Input/Output Processor
Initial Program Load
Keyboard Unit
Line Replaceable Unit
Multifunction CRT Display System
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
Major Mode
Mass Memory Unit
Not Applicable
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Space Transportation System
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Primary Avionics System
Primary Avionics Software System
Pushbutton
Potential Critical Item
Reaction Control System
Rotational Hand Controller
Rockwell International
Redundancy Management
Remote Power Controller
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STS
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TD
THC
m
D
m
B
m
w
Redundant Set
Return to Landing Site
Single Failure Point
Systems Management
Space Transportation System
Software
Switch
Tacan
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Touch Down
Translational Hand Controller
m
u
mi
m
I
m
g
mR
i
I
Z
mm
m
I
mm
m
I
m
u
w
g
z
m
A-2
g
ml
I
ww
m
u
R
N
U
m
w
m
w
w
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
U
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the i_-[lowing
_plifications and additYons.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
_-o OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
_e_ end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MOD_____EJMM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up an--_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at _-r_ition out of Ops 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at_transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE -_begins_at first main gear _
touchdown and en--_ with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
.==
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DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i00--_ober 1986, was employe--_--with the
following amp-Tifications and addition--{.
l •
,
•
,
,
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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9.
i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
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B.3 BFS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
l , BFS failures are analyzed assuming that the BFS is (or
will be) engaged.
RATIONALE: Failure analysis and criticality
determination is done assuming that the
BFS must work when called upon to do so.
• Failures which resulted in BFS engagement are not
identified or analyzed•
RATIONALE: Except for the PASS, it is assumed that
other subsystems are operating within
norma! limits. ....
. Only BFS-specific components and failure modes are
analyzed.
RATIONALE: Failure analysis of PASS/BFS common
components is accomplished within the
PASS analysis.
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This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional Criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at the
5-ottom of each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
p s Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/Ol/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER SUPPLY A(B,C) TO L(R) RHC
LOSS OF OUTPUT, PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) L, R DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI, 33V73A2
MC409-0023-0003 (DISPLAY DRIVER UNIT)
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE POWER SUPPLY RESULTS IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ENGAGE
BFS USING ONE ROTATION HAND CONTROLLER (RHC).
A SECOND FAILURE, IF IT OCCURS IN A POWER SUPPLY TO THE REMAINING
RHC, WILL RESULT IN TOTAL LOSS OF BFS ENGAGE CAPABILITY. LOSS
OF THE CREW/VEHICLE IS POSSIBLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER_SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WOR_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/Ol/86
BAC_ FLIGHT SYSTEM
201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 1/1
ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
HALT RELAY
INADVERTENT OPERATION, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LIW.RINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: j.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
T)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 81V72A321, 81V72A322, 81V72A323; AVIONICS BAYS l&2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0023 (BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, ERRONEOUS INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTENT OPERATION OF A HALT RELAY STOPS THE PROCESSING OF
SOFTWARE IN THE INTERFACING GPC$_ _ A-?A_LURE OCCURIqqG IN THE HALT
RELAY TO THE BFS GPC RENDERS THE BFS TEMPORARILY USELESS. LOSS
OF THE CREW/VEHICLE MAY RESULT.
FAILURE(S) 0C_URING IN THE KALT_LAY(S) TO THE PASS GPC(S) ON-
ORBIT MAY IMPACT THE MISSION. A FAILURE OCCURING PRELAUNCH WILL
CAUSE A LAUNCH DELAY OR SCRUB.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/Ol/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
202
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HALT RELAY
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 81V72A321, 81V72A322, 81V72A323; AVIONICS BAYS l&2
PART NUMBER: MC6!5-0023 (BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
STRUCTURAL:FAILURE, LOSS OF_INPOT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THE HALT RELAY TO A PASS GPC PREVENTS IPL OF THAT GPC.
THE GPC ALSO CANNOT BE POWERED OFF AND THEN BACK ON AGAIN.
MULTIPLE FAILURES MAY IMPACT THE MISSION.
LOSS OF THE HALT RELAY TO THE BFS GPC HAS NO IMPACT. BFS HAS
POWER-ON RESTART CAPABILITY; THEREFORE IT CAN BE POWERED ON AND
OFF WITHOUT BEING PUT INTO HALT. ........._
REFERENCES: JSC 18820
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-4
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYS_SW0_KSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
203
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HAND CONTROLLER ENGAGE DRIVER
LOSS OF DISCRETE OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 81V72A321, 81V72A322, 81V72A323; AVIONICS BAYS l&2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0023 (BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ONE HCED CAUSES LOSS OF ENGAGE CAPABILITY FROM ONE
RHC_ THE BROADCASTINGIIQ F _ ENGAG_ DISC_TE T ° THE BF c MODULES
IS DISABLED.
A SECOND FAILURE, IF IT OCCURS IN AN HCED INTERFACING WITH THE
REMAINING RHC, WILL RESULT IN TOTAL LOSS OF BFS ENGAGE
CAPABILITY. LOSS OFTHE _EW/_EHiCLE_SPOSSIBLE.
I
REFERENCES: JSC 18820
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/Ol/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HAND CONTROLLER ENGAGE DRIVER
LOSS OF 28 VDC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: I/i TAL:
ONORBIT: I/NA AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/i
i/I
1/l
c[P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V72A321, 81V72A322, 81V72A323; AVIONICS BAYS l&2
MC615-0023 (BACKUP FLIGHT cONTROLLER)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HCED 28 VDC OUTPUT PROVIDES POWER TO THE ENGAGE LOGIC OPTICAL
ISOLATORS. LOSS OF THIS POWER PREVENTS THE ENGAGE DISCRETES FROM
BEING TRANSMITTED TO THE ENGAGE LOGIC. THE INTERFACING GPC WILL
NOT RESPOND PROPERLY WHEN BFS ENGAGE IS ATTEMPTED.
IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS IN THE BFC MODULE INTERFACING WITH THE BFS
GPC (NORMALLY GPC 5), ENGAGE CAPABILITY IS LOST. LOSS OF THE
CREW/VEHICLE MAY RESULT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/oi/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
2O5
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGAGE / DISENGAGE LOGIC
LOSS OF OUTPUT, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS : i/1
LIFTOFF: i/I TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: I/NA AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 81V72A321, 81V72A322, 81V72A323; AVIONICS BAYS l&2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0023 (BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INCORRECT OUTPUT FROM THE ENGAGE/DISENGAGE LOGIC INHIBITS THE
INTERFACING GPC FROM ENGAGING/DISENGAGING PROPERLY. THIS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE DURING DYNAMIC FLIGHT PHASES.
THIS IS A SINGLE POINT FAILURE IF IT OCCURS IN THE BFC MODULE
INTERFACING WITH THE BFS GPC (NORMALLY GPC 5).
REFERENCES: JSC 18820
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/oi/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
206
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CRT SELECT LOGIC _
LOSS OF OUTPUT, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
B)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
81V72A321, 81V72A322, 81V72A323; AVIONICS BAYS l&2
MC615-0023 (BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE BFC CRT SELECT LOGIC PREVENTS THE CORRECT BFS CRT
ASSIGNMENT FROM BEING BROADCAST TO THE INTERFACING GPC. BFS CRT
SELECTION MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY KEYBOARD ENTRY AS A BACKUP.
LOSS OF ALL MEANS OF ASSIGNING A CRT TO THE BFS CAUSES LOSS OF
BFS CRT DISPLAYS PRE-ENGAGE. POST-ENGAGE, BFS WILL CONTROL CRT'S
1 & 2 BY DEFAULT. SAFETY OF THE CREW/VEHICLE IF UNAFFECTED. IF
THE FAILURE OCCURS PRELAUNCH, LAUNCH MAY BE SCRUBBED.
REFERENCES: jsc Is82o,Jsc 12vvo
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/01/86 HIGHEST _RITICALITY
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM FLIGHT:
207 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOLERANCE
BFC POWER SUPPLY (5 VDC)
LOSS OF OUTPUT, PARTIAL OUTPUT, FAILS OUT OF
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 81V72A321, 81V72A322, 81V72A323; AVIONICS BAYS l&2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0023 (BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBR_, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILU_REOF _E BFCPDWE_SUPPLY WILL-INITIATEK RESET OF THE
ENGAGE LATCHES BY THE POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR LOGIC. IF THIS
OCCURS POST-ENGAGE IN THE BFC MQDU_INTERFACING WITH THE BFS
GPC, THE BFSWiLL DiSEN_AGE_ LOSS OFTHE_REW/VEHICLE iS
POSSIBLE.
IN ADDITION, LOSS OF POWER TO THE GPC RUN/STANDBY/HALT DISCRETES
WILL LEAVE THE GPC "STUCK" IN THE LAST VALID STATE. MULTIPLE
FAILURES WILL PROBABLY IMPACT THE MISSION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/Ol/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
2O8
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR LOGIC
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/NA AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 81V72A321, 81V72A322, 81V72A323; AVIONICS BAYS l&2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0023 (BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTENT OPERATION OF THE POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR LOGIC WILL
RESET THE BFS ENGAGE DISCRETES. IF THIS OCCURS POST-ENGAGE IN
THE BFC MODULE INTERFACING WITH THE BFS GPC, THE BFS WILL _
DISENGAGE.
THE BFS MAY BE RE-ENGAGED, BUT LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE IS A
POSSIBILITY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/Ol/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
209
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR LOGIC
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST- L.W.HINs DALE/E. E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: j.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: .... 3/NA AOA: 1/l
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: 81V72A321, 81V72A322, 81V72A323; AVIONICS BAYS l&2
PART NUMBER: MC6i5-002_3 (BAC_P FLIG_ CONTROLLER)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL sTREss
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR LOGIC TO DETECT POWER
OVERFLOW/UNDERFLOW MAKES CORRECT OPERATION OF THE
ENGAGE/DISENGAGE LOGIC QUESTIONABLE. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS IN
THE BFC MODULE INTERFACING WITH THE BFS GPC, ENGAGE/DISENGAGE MAY
BE INHIBITED.
THE WORST CASE EFFECT IS LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820
C-ll
_ REPORT DATE 12/18/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/oi/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
301
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BACKUP GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOF F: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: I/NA AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B IF] C [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY
IBM AP-101 CPU / IBM 4P1 IOP
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM THE BFS GPC WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE
CONTROL WHEN THE BFS IS ENGAGED. LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE IS
PROBABLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM FLIGHT: i/I
MDAC ID: 302 ABORT: I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BACKUP GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E,E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER (GPC)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: I/NA AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY
PART NUMBER: IBM AP-101 cPU/ IBM 4PI IOP
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCKi VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LACK OF CORRECT OUTPUT FROM THE BFS GPC WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE CONTROL WHEN THE BFS IS ENGAGED. LOSS OF THE ....
CREW/VEHICLE IS PROBABLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/oi/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
401
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BFS ENGAGE PUSHBUTTON
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) SWITCHES
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
30V73A5, 30V73A6; L, R ROTATION HAND CONTROLLER
MC621-0043-3046 (ROTATION HAND CONTROLLER)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, PHYSICAL JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE BFS ENGAGE PUSHBUTTON FAILED OPEN PREVENTS BFS ENGAGE USING
ONE RHC.
FAILURE OF BOTH PUSHBUTTONS CAUSES COMPLETE LOSS OF BFS ENGAGE
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE IS POSSIBLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
402
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BFS ENGAGE PUSHBUTTON
INADVERTENT OPERATION, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J. EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SWITCHES
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
30V73A5, 30V73A6; L, R ROTATION HAND CONTROLLER
MC621-0043-3046 (ROTATION HAND CONTROLLER)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, PHYSICAL JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INADVERTENT OPERATION OF ONE OR BOTH ENGAGE PUSHBUTTONS WILL
CAUSE THE BFS_ BE_OMEENGAoGED.
THIS IS AN EXTREMELY UNDESIRABLE SITUATION ......................
BEEN ASSIGNED ASSUMING THAT A SMOOTH TRANSITION IS MADE FROM PASS
TO BFS, AND THAT THE BFS PERFORMS AS INTENDED. IF THE FAILURE
OCCURS PRELAUNCH, LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED OR SCRUBBED.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/Ol/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
403
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BFC DISENGAGE SWITCH
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) SWITCHES
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [ F ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6AS; PANEL F6 A5 $6
ME452-0102-7302
CAUSES: SWITCH JAMMED, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A "FAILED OPEN" DISENGAGE SWITCH IS A LOSS OF THE NOMINAL MEANS
OF DISENGAGING THE BFS. THE OTHER WAY TO DISENGAGE BFS / RE-
ENGAGE PASS IS TO RE-IPL PASS GPC'S AND RECYCLE POWER ON THE BFS
GPC.
LOSS OF ALL MEANS OF DISENGAGING BFS / RE-ENGAGINGPASS WILL
IMPACT THE MISSION IF BFS HAS BEEN ENGAGED DURING ASCENT. SAFETY
OF THE CREW/VEHICLE IS UNAFFECTED.
REFERENCES : JSC 18820
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/oi/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
404
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BFC DISENGAGE SWITCH
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO RE-OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) SWITCHES
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICAL ITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: I/NA AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6A5; PANEL F6 A5 $6
ME452-0102-7302
CAUSES: SWITCH JAMMED, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE DISENGAGE SWITCH IS FAILED CLOSED, THE BFS CANNOT BE
ENGAGED. LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE IS POSSIBLE.
Imm
REFERENCES: JSC 18820
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS woRKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/Ol/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
4O5
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BFC CRT DISPLAY SWITCH
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) SWITCHES
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
35V73A3A1; PANEL C3 A1 S17
ME452-0102-7101 !
CAUSES: SWITCH JAMMED, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE BFC CRT DISPLAY SWITCH PREVENTS USE OF THE BFC CRT
SELECT SWITCH. A BAC_p MEANS 0F AS$iGN_G CRT'S TO THE BFS IS
BY KEYB0_D ENTRY.
LOSS OF ALL MEANS OF ASSIGNING A CRT TO THE BFS CAUSES LOSS OF
BFS CRT DISPLAYS PRE-ENGAGE. IF THIS OCCURS PRE-LAUNCH, LAUNCH
WILL BE DELAYED OR SCRUBBED. POST-ENGAGE, BFS WILL CONTROL CRT'S
1 & 2 BY DEFAULT.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 12770
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM FLIGHT:
406 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
BFC CRT SELECT SWITCH
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO SWITCH, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) SWITCHES
2)
s)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
35V73A3A1; PANEL C3 A1 S18
ME452-0102-7106
CAUSESI ....SWITCH JAMMED, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, PIECE PARTSTRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE BFC CRT SELECT SWITCH IS A LOSS OF ONE MEANS OF
ASSIGNING CRT'S TO THE BFS. CRT ASSIGNMENT MAY ALSO BE
ACCOMPLISHED BY KEYBOARD ENTRY.
LOSS OF ALL MEANS OF ASSIGNING A CRT TO THE BFS CAUSES LOSS OF
BFS CRT DISPLAYS PRE-ENGAGE. IF THIS OCCURS PRE-LAUNCH, LAUNCH
WILL BE DELAYED OR SCRUBBED. POST-ENGAGE, BFS WILL CONTROL CRT'S
1 & 2 BY DEFAULT.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 12770
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IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/oi/s6
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
407
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
i/i
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
BFS GPC (USUALLY GPC 5) POWER SWITCH
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) SWITCHES
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: I/NA AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73A6; PANEL 06
ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: SWITCH JAMMED, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF POWER TO THE BFS GPC CAUSES LOSS OF BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
SOFTWARE. LOSS OF THE CREW/VEH_IC_ MAY RESULT. o_ !FTHE FAILURE
OCCURS PRELAUNCH, LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED OR SCRUBBED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
4O8
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BFS GPC (USUALLY GPC 5) OUTPUT SWITCH
FAILS OUT OF "BACKUP"
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) SWITCHES
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT I}_DW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: l/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [F ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
33V73A6; PANEL 06
ME452-0102-7306
CAUSES: SWITCH JAMMED, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE BFS GPC OUTPUT SWITCH FAILS OUT OF THE "BACKUP" POSITION,
THE BFS CANNOT BE ENGAGED' LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE IS POSSIBLE.
m REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-21
EINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
409
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BFS GPC (USUALLY GPC 5) MODE SWITCH
INADVERTENTLY IN "HALT"
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) SWITCHES
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: I/1
ONORB IT: i/NA AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: l/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73A6; PANEL 06
ME452-0102-7361
CAUSES: SWITCH JAMMED, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE HALT CONTACT IS FAILED ON, THE BFS GPC IS PREVENTED FROM
EXECUTING SOFTWARE. VEHICLE CONTROL IS LOST WHEN THE BFS IS
ENGAGED. LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE MAY RESULT.
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REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 12770
m !
ms
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-22
B !
Uw
m
i
m
i
=
=
F
m
L
R
! --_
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM FLIGHT: 3/1R
501 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
L(R) DDU
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 7.5 AMP. - MAIN A (B,C) SUPPLY TO
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) CIRCUIT PROTECTION
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
..........CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC
313
311R
3/NA
311R
311R
A [ 1 ]
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
c[P]
33V73A14, 33V73A15, 33V73AI6; PANELS O14, O15, O16
MC454-0026-2075
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL SHOCK, _ ViB_TION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, co_TAMi_ATIOM .........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH DDU HAS TWO REDUNDANT POWER SOURCES. FAILURE OF TWO CIRCUIT
BREAKERS FOR THE L(R) DDU WILL _REVENT ENGAGE USING THE L(R)RHC.
FAILURE OF ALL FOUR CIBCUIT BREAKERS RESULTS IN A COMPLETE LOSS
OF BFS ENGAG_E CAPABILITY.
LOSS OF THE CR_/VE_ICLE_MAY RESULT. '_
REFERENCES: JSC 18820
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM FLIGHT: 1/l
MDAC ID: 502 ABORT: I/i
ITEM: FUSE F9, 1 AMP. - CNTL BUS AB3 SUPPLY TO DISENGAGE
SWITCH AND BFC MODULES IA & IB (HCED & ENGAGE LOGIC)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CIRCUIT PROTECTION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS: l/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBI T: 3/NA AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: l/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F] C [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6A5; PANEL F6 A5
ME45i-0018-0100
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LQSS O_ POWER TO BFC MODULES IA & IB HCED'S RESULTS IN LOSS OF
EN_A--GE _ CAPAB_LI_F!_M _T_ Lk_FT i_ .........._2!__i_ _ _ _ ...... ' - _ _
LOSS OF POWER TO BFC MODULES IA & IB ENGAGE LOGIC CAUSES LOSS OF
ENGAGE/DISENGAGE CAPABILITY FOR GPC'S 1 (PASS) & 4 (PASS). DUAL
CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE MAY RESULT WHEN BFS IS ENGAGED. LOSS OE
THE CREW/VEHICLE IS POSSIBLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 12770
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
i/i
ITEM: FUSE F10, 1 AMP. - CNTL BUS AB3 SUPPLY TO
DISENGAGE SWITCH AND BFC MODULE 2A - HCED & ENGAGE LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CIRCUIT PROTECTION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
............ _CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/NA AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/i
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6A5; PANEL _F6 A5
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO BFC MODULE 2A HCED RESULTS IN LOSS OF ENGAGE
CAPABILITY USING THE LEFT RHC.
LOSS OF POWER TO BFC MODULE 2A ENGAGE LOGIC CAUSES LOSS OF•
ENGAGE/DISENGAGE CAPABILITY FOR GPC 2 (PASS). DUAL CONTROL OF
THE VEHICLE MAY RESULT WHEN BFS IS ENGAGED. LOSS OF THE
CREW/VEHICLE IS POSSIBLE.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 12770
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SuBsYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 504 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: FUSE FII, 1 AMP. - CNTL BUS CA1 SUPPLY TO
DISENGAGE SWITCH AND BFC MODULES 2B, 3A, 3B - HCED & ENGAGE LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) CIRCUIT PROTECTION
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CR!TICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/NA AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A6A5; PANEL F6 A5
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO BFC MODULES 2B, 3A, & 3B HCED'S RESULTS INLOSS
OF ENGAGE CAPABILITY USING THE RIGHT RHC.
LOSS OF POWER TO BFC MODULES 2B, 3A, & 3B ENGAGE LOGIC CAUSES
LOSS OF ENGAGE/DISENGAGE CAPABILITY FOR GPC'S 3 (PASS) & 5 (BFS).
THE BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM IS INACCESSIBLE. LOSS OF THE
CREW/VEHICLE IS POSSIBLE.
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REFERENCES: JSC 18820, JSC 12770
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/Ol/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
5O5
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/1
ITEM: FUSE F49, 3 AMP. - ESS BUS 3AB SUPPLY TO GPC
OUTPUT SWITCHES (BACKUP & NORMAL DISCRETES)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CIRCUIT PROTECTION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/NA AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73A6; PANEL 06
ME451-0018-0300
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO THE BACKUp AND NORMAL DISCRETES PREVENTS
SELECTION OF A BACKUP GPC. WHEN THE ENGAGE PUSHBUTTON IS
DEPRESSED, ALL GPC'S WILL DISENGAGE. LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE IS
POSSIBLE.
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IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 506 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP. - ESS BUS SUPPLY TO BFS GPC (USUALLY
GPC 5) POWER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CIRCUIT PROTECTION
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ...........ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/NA AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATi ON:
PART NUMBER:
33V73A6; PANEL 06
ME451-0018-0300
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATION A._LE :.......................................................................
THERE ARE THREE REDUNDANT POWER SUPPLIES TO EACH GPC. AN OPEN _
CIRCUIT IN ONE SUPPLY CAUSES LOSS OF ONE LEG OF REDUNDANCY. OPEN
CIRCUITS IN ALL THREE POWER SUPPLIES TO THE BFS GPC RESULT IN
LOSS OF THE BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM.
LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHICLE IS POSSIBLE.
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/oi/s6
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
601
BFC ENGAGE LIGHT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INDICATORS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICAL!TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LO CAT ION:
PART _MBER:
34V73A2, 34V73A4; PANELS F2 & F4
ME452-0061-9105
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CREW RECEIVES SEVERAL INDICATIONS THAT THE BFS HAS BECOME
ENGAGED/INCLUDIN_G BFC LIGHTS, OUTPUT TALKBACKS, CAM DIAGONAL
LIGHTS AND CRT DISPLAY INFORMATION.
FAILURE OF ONE OR BOTH BFC ENGAGE LIGHTS TO INDICATE BFS ENGAGE
HAS NO SERIOUS IMPACT TO THE CREW/VEHICLE OR TO THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820
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IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86
BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
602
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: BFC ENGAGE LIGHT
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) INDICATORS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ i] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
34V73A2, 34V73A4; PANELS F2 & F4
ME452-0061-9105
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CREW RECEIVES SEVERAL INDICATIONS THAT THE BFS HAS BECOME
ENGAGED_ INCLUDING BFC LIGHTS, OUTPUT TALKBACKS, CAM DIAGONAL
LIGHTS AND CRT DI_LAYIN?ORMATION.
INADVERTENT OPERATION OF ONE OR BOTH BFC ENGAGE LIGHTS, WHILE
CONFUSING, HAS NO SERIOUS EFFECT ON THE CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC 18820
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201
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301
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401
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407
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409
5O2
503
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM FAILURE MODE
POWER SUPPLY A
(B,C) TO L(R) RHC
HALT RELAY
HALT RELAY
HAND CONTROLLER
ENGAGE DRIVER
HAND CONTROLLER
ENGAGE DRIVER
ENGAGE/DISENGAGE
LOGIC
BFC POWER SUPPLY
(5 VDC)
POWER UP/DOWN
MONITOR LOGIC
POWER UP/DOWN
MONITOR LOGIC
BACKUP GPC
(USUALLY GPC 5)
BACKUP GPC
(USUALLY GPC 5)
BFS ENGAGE
PUSHBUTTON
BFC DISENGAGE
SWITCH
BFC DISENGAGE
SWITCH
BFS GPC (USUALLY
GPC 5) POWER SWITCH
BFS GPC (USUALLY
GPC 5) OUTPUT SWITCH
BFS GPC (USUALLY
GPC 5) MODE SWITCH
FUSE F9, 1 AMP. -
CNTL BUS AB3 SUPPLY
TO DISENGAGE SWITCH
AND BFC MODULES IA
& IB (HCED & ENGAGE
LOGIC)
FUSE FI0, 1 AMP. -
CNTL BUS AB3 SUPPLY
TO DISENGAGE SWITCH
AND BFC MODULE 2A -
HCED & ENGAGE LOGIC
LOSS OF OUTPUT, PARTIAL
OUTPUT
INADVERTENT OPERATION, FAILS
TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE
LOSS OF DISCRETE OUTPUT
LOSS OF 28 VDC OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT, ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT, PARTIAL
OUTPUT, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS
TO RE-OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED
FAILS OUT OF "BACKUP"
INADVERTENTLY IN "HALT"
OPEN CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT
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WMDAC-ID
504
5O5
ITEM
FUSE Fll, 1 AMP. -
CNTL BUS CA1 SUPPLY
TO DISENGAGE SWITCH
AND BFC MODULES 2B,
3A, 3B - HCED &
ENGAGE LOGIC
FUSE F49, 3 AMP. -
ESS BUS 3AB SUPPLY
TO GPC OUTPUT
SWITCHES (BACKUP &
NORMAL DISCRETES)
FAILURE MODE
OPEN CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT
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